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1.	Mapping	out	the	terrain:	inequality	and	politics.	
	Inequality	is	back	as	a	public	concern	in	Western	democracies,	and	so	is	the	question	about	how	to	deal	with	it	politically,	i.e.	political	decisions	are	expected	to	restore	acceptable	levels	of	inequality	rather	than	to	set	up	a	regime	of	complete	equality	among	citizens.	The	logic	behind	this	request	is	also	purely	political:	as	Branco	Milanovic	has	argued	in	his	sober	treatise	on	global	inequality,	if	the	latter	 leads	 to	 the	 rise	 of	 collective	 anger	 and	 hence	 populism,	 democracies	 become	 severely	endangered,	affected	by	a	lack	of	legitimacy.	What	an	acceptable	level	of	inequality	is	cannot	be	said	easily,	just	as	it	is	neither	easy	to	predict	when	will	a	given	degree	of	inequality	will	be	perceived	as	
unacceptable.	 The	key	 to	 that	dilemma	 is,	 precisely,	 the	perceived	 quality	of	both	psychopolitical	states:	it	depends	heavily	on	public	moods	and	private	perceptions,	as	well	as	in	the	effect	of	political	discourses	 and	mobilizations.	 Yet	 it	 seldom	 is	 a	 capricious	 thing,	 responding	 usually	 to	 external	economic	shocks	-mostly	a	recession-	that	trigger	the	feeling	of	being	empoverished.	This	feeling,	in	turn,	is	grounded	in	two	main	comparative	operations:	whether	a	subject	is	better	off	as	compared	to	her	past	self	and	as	compared	to	other	people.		These	nuances	are	relevant	if	we	try	to	answer	the	question	about	the	political	nature	of	inequality.	Is	inequality	a	political	problem?	Or,	to	put	it	differently,	is	it	in	itself	a	political	problem,	or	just	a	social	problem	that	may	or	even	must	be	transformed	into	a	political	problem?	Might	it	also	be	the	case	 that	 we	 can	 conceive	 of	 problems	whose	 political	 quality	 is	 partial	 or	 can	 be	measured	 in	degrees?		What	those	intrincacies	show	is	that	inequality	possesses	an	unescapable	social	dimension.	It	is	a	relation	between	subjects	that	compare	themselves	with	each	other	within	a	social	order	that	makes	inequality	possible	or	does	not	hinder	its	production.	However,	the	sources	of	inequality	must	be	identified,	because	if	 inequality	 is	attributed	to	differences	 in	natural	talents	or	abilities,	 the	state	could	only	impede	it	via	a	brutal	equalizing	of	socioeconomic	conditions	that	would	be	totalitarian	in	nature	-while	differences	themselves	would	remain,	as	some	people	would	be	more	intelligent	or	pretty	or	even	happier	than	other.	Of	course,	a	more	reasonable	standpoint	can	be	adopted,	so	that	what	matters	is	that	natural	differences	do	not	lead	to	too	large	social	differences,	a	task	that	would	pertain	politics.	Somebody	could	even	argue	that	such	differences	are	not	completely	natural,	as	a	tragic	loop	can	take	place	if	someone	is	born	disadvantaged	and	thus	deprived	of	the	chance	to	move	upward,	but	could	improve	her	lot	if	that	lack	of	opportunities	is	dealt	with	politically.	This	claim	could	 hold	 even	 if	 we	 assume	 that	 a	 part	 of	 those	 natural	 differences	 belong	 to	 each	 genetic's	hardware,	in	a	twofold	way:	by	recurring	to	epigenetics	or	by	stating	that,	in	such	case,	the	individual	is	hardly	responsible	of	her	fortunes,	so	that	the	reasons	for	political	intervention	are	firm.		For	the	purposes	of	 this	paper,	 inequality	will	be	understood	as	a	real	or	perceived	difference	 in	socioeconomic	status	among	individuals	that	may	be	at	least	partially	corrected	by	the	state.	That	is,	inequality	is	seen	as	tractable	by	political	means,	irrespective	of	the	effectiveness	of	the	solutions	so	adopted.	If	the	problem	could	not	be	solved	at	all,	as	seems	the	case	with	natural	differences	among	individuals,	 it	 could	hardly	 qualify	 as	 a	 problem	 in	 the	 first	 place.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 a	 political	problem	is	defined	as	one	that	arises	from	the	political	organization	of	society,	so	that	if	society	were	organized	differently	from	the	outset	the	very	problem	-an	unacceptable	degree	of	inequality-	would	never	manifest	itself.	What	remains	to	be	explored	is	thus	whether	inequality	is	in	itself	a	political	problem	and,	depending	on	the	answer,	whether	it	is	justified	to	deal	with	it	as	such.		This	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	First,	the	question	about	the	sources	of	inequality	will	be	explored	together	with	the	tractability	of	the	latter	as	a	political	problem.	Secondly,	the	reasons	for	the	current	increase	in	inequality	are	reflected	upon,	in	order	to	add	collective	phenomena	at	the	macrolevel	to	the	more	basic,	 even	prepolitical	 considerations	made	 in	 the	 first	 section.	 Thirdly,	 the	problems	posed	by	envy	and	resentment	will	be	considered,	so	that	the	key	role	of	perception	is	highlighted.	Finally,	 a	 conclusion	 is	 offered,	whereby	 both	 capitalism	 and	 inequality	 are	 seen	 as	 prepolitical	features	of	the	species	that	however	must	be	politically	approached	and	dealt	with,	lest	an	excessive	
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degree	of	inequality	threatens	the	general	benefits	provided	by	an	unavoidable	but	acceptable	level	of	socioeconomic	inequality.		
2.	The	prepolitics	of	inequality.		Inequality's	rentrée	in	the	public	and	academic	debate	has	been	marked	by	a	French	touch.	It	makes	sense,	 since	 the	 attention	 to	 inequality	 is	 actually	 a	 very	 French	 thing	 -a	 concern	 that,	 in	 its	socioeconomic	sense,	has	been	brought	to	the	global	spotlight	by	Thomas	Piketty's	unlikely	best-
seller.	Its	first	edition,	published	in	France,	did	not	stir	such	scholarly	passions	as	the	translation	to	English	 has:	 after	 all,	 the	 topic	 is	 always	 present	 in	 the	 French	 conversation,	whereas	 economic	stratification	has	not	traditionally	had	such	traction	in	the	American	collective	psyche.		At	 least,	 that	 is	how	 journalist	Gillian	Tett	explained	Piketty's	sudden	success	 in	 the	anglo-saxon	world.	The	French	economist	would	dispel	the	myth	of	equality	in	freedom	-according	to	which,	in	opposition	to	an	European	tradition	plagued	by	inherited	privileges	and	entrenched	interests,	any	American	citizen	should	be	able	to	enrich	herself	through	work	in	a	meritocratic	society1.	But	data	do	not	seem	to	support	this	principle	anymore,	or	not	just	now	-and	that	is	why	inequality	is	back	to	mainstream	 politics.	 Yet	 it	 would	 be	 unfair	 to	 say	 that	 inequality	 has	 been	 absent	 in	 the	 US	conversation,	since	the	most	influential	piece	of	political	theory	published	in	the	second	half	of	the	twentieth	century	was	not	written	in	Paris	but	in	Harvard	and	had	inequality	-the	goal	of	assigning	resources	 fairly	within	a	 society-	as	a	central	 theme:	 John	Rawls'	A	Theory	of	 Justice2.	From	New	England	has	also	come,	much	more	recently,	a	brief	work	by	Darun	Acemoglu	and	James	Robinson	which,	from	an	institutionalist	standpoint,	present	a	deep	critique	of	Piketty's	thesis3.		My	 purpose	 in	 this	 section	 is	 to	 dwell	 on	 arguments	 like	 those	 presented	 by	 Rawls	 and	Acemoglu/Robinson	-against	Piketty-	in	order	to	highlight	the	unsurmountable	difficulties	that	pose	the	goal	of	equality.	By	doing	so,	I	hope	to	explore	the	prepolitics	of	inequality.		Piketty's	work	 has	 been	widely	 discussed.	 His	main	 arguments	 are	well-known:	 challenging	 the	Kuznet's	curve,	Piketty	claims	that	inequality	does	not	tend	to	disappear	as	economies	mature.	As	a	result,	capitalism	would	not	be	able	to	neutralize	the	inequality	that	it	generates.	The	main	reason	lies	in	the	formula	r	>	g,	according	to	which	capital	provides	greater	returns	than	labour.	With	the	passing	 of	 time,	 this	 explains	 the	 accumulation	 of	 wealth.	 If	 the	 latter	 is	 passed	 on	 between	generations,	inequality	grows.	In	times	of	low	economic	growth,	inequality	grows	more	rapidly.		 	This	 reasoning	 has	 been	 subjected	 to	 a	 number	 of	 criticisms.	 Leaving	methodological	 questions	aside,	one	can	make	objections	of	different	kinds:	economic	(the	role	of	technological	disruption	as	a	temporary	reason	for	the	widening	of	inequality,	the	decrease	in	global	poverty,	the	availability	of	goods	 and	 services	 that	 would	 have	 been	 the	 preserve	 of	 elites	 yesteryear),	 sociological	 (the	influence	of	genetics	in	poverty),	or	normative	(inequality's	increase	could	well	be	less	important	that	greater	growth).	Yet	it	remains	the	case	that	inequality	has	increased	within	advanced	societies	and	 emergent	 economies,	 irrespective	 of	 the	 transient	 nature	 of	 the	 reasons	 that	 can	 are	 often	invoked	to	explain	this	evolution:	technological	change,	globalization,	financial	crisis.	This	is	where	Acemoglu	and	Robinson	step	 in:	 they	suggest	 that	Piketty	 is	affected	by	 the	same	pathology	 that	suffered	in	the	past	economists	like	Marx	or	Ricardo:	the	need	to	formulate	general	laws,	ignoring	the	key	role	played	by	culture	and	institutions	within	society.	So	that	the	general	law,	r	>	g,	is	not	a	given	but	one	of	the	many	factors	that	can	explain	inequality.		However,	if	we	free	Piketty	from	the	burden	of	theleology	and	reduce	him	to	his	essence,	he	still	has	something	 important,	 albeit	hardly	new,	 to	 say.	Or	we	can	say	 something	 important	dwelling	on	
																																																						1	Gillian	Tett,	"Lessons	form	a	rock-star	economist",	25	abril.	2	John	Rawls,	A	Theory	of	Justice,	Harvard,	Harvard	University	Press,	1971.	3	Darren	Acemoglu	and	James	Robinson,	"The	Rise	and	Decline	of	General	Laws	of	Capitalism",	NBER	Working	Paper	No.	20766,	December	2014.	
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Piketty.	Namely:	that	economic	equality	is	unfeasible	without	an	extreme	degree	of	coertion.	In	fact,	not	even	state	socialism	was	able	to	make	that	equality	possible	-some	were	more	equal	than	others.	This	does	not	imply	that	inequality	must	be	accepted	as	such,	in	any	forms	it	might	take;	but	it	does	imply	that	it	is	impossible	to	erradicate,	hence	forcing	us	to	limit	ourselves	to	reduce	it	if	we	decide	so.	Moreover,	these	considerations	are	prior	to,	and	independent	from,	the	debate	about	equality's	or	inequality's	desiderability:	before	we	develop	any	normative	argument	about	this,	it	is	advisable	to	know	 in	which	degree	and	 through	what	means	 is	 equality	 a	 goal	 that	 can	be	achieved	at	 all.	Feasibility	trumps	desiderability.		For	that	reason,	it	is	helpful	to	reduce	the	problem	of	equality	to	its	most	basic	components.	This	simplification	is	akin	to	the	one	practiced	by	contractualist	thinkers	who	employ	the	fiction	of	the	state	of	nature	 in	order	 to	shed	some	 light	on	 the	question	about	 the	state.	Likewise,	 if	we	place	ourselves	in	some	sort	of	original	situation	as	far	as	equality	is	concerned	(leaving	aside	institutional	and	political	differences	between	particular	 societies),	what	Piketty	 reminds	us	 is	 that	 the	 sheer	accumulation	of	capital	makes	some	people	richer	than	other,	that	such	capital	tends	to	grow	and	is	intergenerationally	transmitted,	thus	reinforcing	the	dividing	line	between	those	who	were	able	to	stock	it	initially	and	those	who	were	not.		Strictly	speaking,	public	confiscation	is	not	enough	to	prevent	accumulation,	since	it	entails	a	simple	transference	of	rents	from	private	to	public	hands.	That	is	why	Piketty	himself	finds	that	wars	are	the	best	levelling	mechanisms	-and	the	greater	the	war,	the	more	radical	the	levelling.	After	a	brutal	conflict,	 such	as	 the	Second	World	War,	 society	moves	closer	 to	a	new	beginning:	a	Year	Zero	of	Equality.	According	to	Piketty,	if	wealth	is	not	even	more	unevenly	distributed	today,	is	because	not	so	much	 time	 has	 passed	 since	 1945.	 In	 other	 words,	 not	 enough	 time	 has	 passed	 for	 some	 to	accumulate	much	more	than	others.		At	this	point,	Acemoglu	and	Robinson	would	protest	that	institutional	factors	-redistribution	by	the	state-	may	prevent	the	gradual	but	steady	divergence	between	the	haves	and	the	have-less.	And	so	it	seems:	Sweden	is	different	than	England.	But	in	truth	it	can	only	prevent	it	up	to	a	point,	because,	unless	 the	 authorities	 assume	 full	 confiscatory	 powers	 and	 implement	 a	 policy	 whose	 goal	 is	absolute	equality,	nothing	can	prevent	that	some	people	perform	better	than	other	in	the	economic	realm	-thus	distancing	themselves	from	those	who	perform	relatively	worse	and	ending	up,	in	fact,	inhabiting	truly	different	social	worlds.	I	am	not	going	to	press	the	question	as	to	why	some	perform	better	than	others,	although	potential	reasons	abound.	One	way	or	another,	there	will	be	winners	and	losers.	In	relative	terms:	they	must	not	be	absolute	winners	and	losers	to	be	winners	and	losers	in	relation	to	each	others.		Therefore,	r	>	g	 is	not	the	explanation	for	 inequality,	but	rather	a	factor	that	helps	to	explain	the	increase	in	the	wealth	of	those	who	are	already	-by	performance	or	inheritance-	far	better	off	than	others.	Of	 course,	we	 could	 think	of	 suppressing	 the	 right	 to	 inherit,	 so	 that	 no	wealth	 could	be	transmitted	but	to	the	state,	which	in	turn	would	use	it	for	making	people	even.	However,	this	would	create	other,	arguably	more	disturbing,	problems:	incentives	for	the	initial	accumulation	of	wealth	would	be	suppressed,	thus	neutralizing	the	very	precondition	of	any	redistribution:	the	creation	of	wealth.		Historically,	even	in	a	"new"society	such	as	the	American	one	-free	of	the	privileges	and	burdens	that	affected	Europe	before	and	after	the	liberal	revolutions-	inequality	starts	to	be	produced	as	soon	as	society	itself	is	in	motion.	Slavery,	though,	shows	as	well	how	difficult	it	is	to	mark	a	true	Year	Zero	of	Equality	when	real	societies	are	at	play.	Still,	California	around	1835	will	be	closer	to	that	stage	than	 London	 in	 2014.	 And	 this	 problem	 is	 acutely	 highlighted	 by	 Robert	 Nozick's	 theory	 of	distributive	justice	-an	answer	to	Rawls4.	Although	Nozick	will	cease	later	to	be	a	libertarian,	this	books	is	concerned	with	the	justification	of	a	minimal	state	compatible	with	the	highest	individual	freedom.	 To	 such	 end,	 he	 deals	 with	 the	 public	 distribution	 of	 wealth,	 attacking	 it	 wherever	 it	
																																																						4	Robert	Nozick,	Anarchy,	State,	Utopia,	Malden,	Blackwell,	2008.	
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threatens	individual	freedom.	For	instance,	to	reach	agreements	and	sign	contracts	-agreements	and	contracts	 whose	 fruits	 are	 distributed	 while	 they	 are	 produced.	 Nozick	 prefers	 distribution	 to	redistribution	-liberty	to	equality.		His	departure	point	is	well-known.	The	fairness	of	individual	(or	familiar)	possessions	depend	on	two	only	factors:	their	original	acquisition	and	its	later	transmission.	A	simple	distributive	principle	emerges	by	which	a	given	distribution	will	be	fair	if	everyone	possessions	are	legitimate.	Yet	reality	complicates	things,	as	usual,	since	it	cannot	be	ignored	that	there	exist	past	injustices.	Thus	Nozick	introduces	a	third	factor:	the	rectification	of	possible	injustices	in	the	acquisition,	possession,	and	transmission	of	 goods.	Therefore,	 a	person	will	 possess	 legitimately	her	 goods	 -and	will	 thus	be	unequal	 in	 relation	 to	 others-	 if	 according	 to	 one	 of	 those	 principles:	 acquisition,	 transmission,	rectification.	So	that	a	given	distribution	of	goods	-be	it	California	around	1835	or	London	in	2014-	will	be	fair	or	unfair	depending	on	its	history.	Nozick:		“The	systems	of	entitlements	is	defensible	when	constituted	by	the	individual	aims	of	individual	transactions.	No	overarching	aim	is	needed,	no	distributional	pattern	is	required.	(...)	From	each	as	they	choose,	to	each	as	
they	are	chosen"5.		If	these	principles	are	applied	equally	to	all	before	a	society	puts	itself	in	motion	-in	the	Year	Zero	of	Equality,	 be	 it	 politically	 created	 anew	 or	 recreated	 via	 the	 rectification	 of	 past	 injustices-	 the	emergence	 of	 inequalities	 among	 individuals	 will	 be	 justified	 and	 nobody,	 according	 to	 Nozick,	should	have	the	right	to	correct	them.	In	this	context,	the	accumulation	of	wealth	derives	from	the	economic	interplay	and	does	not	require	any	rectification	if	no	injustice	 is	made.	For	Nozick,	any	theory	 of	 justice	 based	 upon	 an	 structural	 principle	 of	 distribution	 is	 unacceptable,	 because	 it	determines	ex	ante	who	ends	up	having	what,	thus	interfering	with	personal	liberty.	A	distribution	is	fair	when	its	historical	origin	is	fair,	whereas	public	redistribution	must	be	guided	by	an	abstract	principle	and	thus	cannot	be	legitimate.		What	is	interesting	here,	though,	is	that	not	even	a	libertarian	thinker,	whose	main	goal	is	to	protect	the	sanctity	of	individual	agreements,	can	ignore	the	uneven	opportunities	and	possessions	inherited	from	the	social	past:	the	unavoidable	distance	that	separates	us	from	Year	Zero.	In	this	regard,	no	matter	how	reasonable	Nozick's	principle	of	rectification	may	appear,	its	implementation	would	be	so	difficult	 that	 it	would	never	be	considered	 fully	realized.	What	counts	as	a	past	 injustice,	how	should	the	latter	be	rectified	exactly,	when	is	the	victim	redeemed?	Slavery	is	a	perfect	example	of	the	obstacles	that	faces	any	such	rectification.	Injustices	cannot,	in	fact,	be	rectified.		That	said,	is	the	inequality	produced	afterwards	-once	an	equal	society	is	in	motion-	permissible?	An	inequality	that	is	the	outcome	of	a	socioeconomic	process	where	all	depart	from	the	same	position.		Much	depends	on	what	that	"same	position"	means.	If	 inequality	stems	from	differences	in	talent	and	skills	between	individuals	-Rawls'	"natural	lottery"-,	we	could	protest:	no	individual	can	be	held	responsible	for	her	innate	abilities.	On	the	contrary,	if	such	differences	are	taken	as	a	consequence	of	 our	 common	 humanity,	 another	 rule	 of	 the	 social	 game,	 then	 the	 inequality	 that	 is	 gradually	produced	due	to	the	disparate	performances	of	individuals	(and	groups)	would	be	defensible.		In	a	recent	book,	economist	Robert	Frank	has	emphasized	the	role	that	luck	plays	in	our	lives6.	In	his	view,	the	contingency	of	birth	possesses	a	decisive	importance	for	the	outline	of	our	biographies,	since	 being	 born	 in	 different	 social	 groups	 determines	 the	 extent	 of	 our	 opportunities	 and	 the	strength	of	the	security	net	we	can	rest	on	if	we	fail.	The	latter	point	is	relevant,	insofar	as	what	we	do	with	our	unequal	talents	and	abilities	will	also	differ	depending	on	how	many	chances	we	enjoy	to	get	 it	 right.	Moreover,	Frank	argues,	we	 tend	 to	 think	 that	we	have	conquered	with	our	effort	
																																																						5	Robert	Nozick,	op.	cit.,	2008,	p.	159-160.	6	 John	 Rawls,	 op.	 cit.,	 1971;	 Robert	 Frank:	 Success	 and	 Luck:	 Good	 Fortune	 and	 the	 Myth	 of	 Meritocracy,	Princeton	University	Press,	Princeton,	2016.	
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everything	that	we	have	achieved,	thus	overlooking	the	key	part	that	luck	plays	in	life.	Merit	would	then	be	a	delusion	that	is	hard	to	deactivate	-we	are	the	apparent	protagonists	of	our	lives,	so	that	successes	are	ours	and	failures	are	attributed	to	exogenous	causes.	Frank	claims	that	this	collective	mirage	is	created	by	the	formal	proclamation	of	meritocracy.	If	individual	merits	are	the	product	of	innate	factors	and	systemic	forces,	why	should	the	loser	be	punished?		As	 it	 happens,	 that	 initial	 inequality	 reinforces	 itself	 with	 the	 passing	 of	 time,	 because	 of	 the	accumulation	of	capital	and	its	transmission	via	inheritance.	Year	Zero	would	be	farther	away	in	the	past	and	we	would	end	up	with	the	same	initial	problem:	the	disadvantages	among	individuals	who	do	not	hold	the	same	position	when	beginning	their	lives.	As	a	result,	an	inequality	that	seemed	fair	insofar	as	it	derived	from	an	original	equality	of	opportunity	ends	up	curtailing	the	latter.	Inequality	becomes	thus	a	labyrinth	that	has	no	exit	-just	as	equality.	Needless	to	say,	contemporary	debates	are	not	concerned	with	an	absolute	inequality,	but	with	the	degree	of	inequality	that	is	permissible:	for	 those	 who	 wish	 to	 be	 equal,	 for	 those	 who	 wish	 to	 be	 unequal.	 It	 would	 be	 good	 if	 this	conversation	 dealt	 with	 feasible	 equalities	 and	 inequalities,	 yet	 this	 is	 not	 always	 the	 case:	sometimes	an	unfeasible	equality	is	demanded,	and	the	same	goes	for	inequality.			Now,	the	beauty	of	of	Rawls'	solution	is	that	he	reduces	the	argument	to	its	essential	components.	he	does	so	with	a	clever	move,	that	of	placing	individuals	in	an	"original	position"	where	their	own	personal	 features	and	social	circumstances	are	hidden	under	a	"veil	of	 ignorance"	when	they	are	asked	about	the	kind	of	society	they	would	support	as	preferable.	Their	answer,	according	to	Rawls,	is	a	free	society	whose	state	however	assume	legitimately	the	task	of	redistribute	wealth	in	order	to	help	the	most	disadvantages.	This	social	contract	is	thus	conceived	for	a	society	that	is	already	in	motion,	where	a	given	and	relatively	dynamic	distribution	of	abilities	and	resources	already	exist,	so	that	the	pending	task	is	giving	the	state	a	mandate	to	make	corrections	in	that	distribution.		But	 even	 in	 such	 society,	 as	 long	 as	 it	 remains	 one	 where	 a	 market	 economy	 is	 functioning,	individuals	will	 be	 conditiones	by	 the	 relative	position	occupied	by	 their	 families	when	 they	are	born.	For	those	who	are	disadvantaged	in	relation	to	others,	this	situation	cannot	possibly	be	fair.	Is	it	 fair,	 for	 instance,	 that	 a	 teenager	 inherits	 a	 small	 fortune,	 because	 his	 aunt	 died,	 whilst	 his	classmate	inherits	debts	after	the	accidental	death	of	her	parents?	Maybe	it	is	not	unfair	-but	fair	is	not	either.	This	points	out	to	the	impossibility	to	guarantee	fairness	through	state	redistribution.	Of	course,	when	taxing,	one	does	not	takes	from	Peter	to	give	to	John,	as	Anthony	de	Jasay	claims:	a	Rotschild	is	taken	from,	in	order	to	give	to	John.	However,	maybe	Robert	is	receiving	state	benefits	when	he	could	work	but	refuses	to	do	so.	Or	maybe	Alex	is	also	benefiting	from	state	redistribution,	but	he	makes	enough	money	in	the	parallel	economy	beyond	state	control.	And	so	on,	and	so	forth.		It	can	does	be	concluded	that	equality	is	impossible,	but	too	much	inequality	is	undesirable	-as	the	global	rise	of	populism	in	our	days	comes	to	show.	Yet	it	remains	to	be	elucidated	whether	inequality	is	a	political	problem.	Before	we	answer	that,	it	is	useful	to	complete	the	reflection	about	inequality	in	 the	 asbtract	 by	 considering	 how	 contemporary	 inequality	 is	 produced.	 This	 will	 show	 that	inequality	is	not	by	itself	a	political	problem,	but	rather	a	sociofact,	a	feature	of	social	relations	that	cannot	be	erradicated	yet	can	and	must	be	politicized.		
3.	Inequality	in	the	global	age.		Why	 inequality	must	 be	 politicized	 becomes	 clear	 precisely	 in	 our	 times,	 arguably	 a	moment	 of	transition	between	two	different	varieties	of	capitalism.	The	main	question	is	whether	we	can	affirm	that	an	individual	is	responsible	of	its	own	socioeconomic	destiny.	If	a	robot	puts	someone	out	of	order	after	three	decades	as	a	factory	worker	or	as	accountant,	is	he	to	blame	for	the	corresponding	fall	in	disposable	income?		Current	 economic	 turmoil	 cannot	 be	 explained	 without	 taking	 globalization	 into	 account.	Remarkably,	the	latter	reinforces	the	point	made	above	about	the	degree	in	which	birth	conditions	individual	 performances	 and,	 ultimately,	whole	 lives.	 It	 does	 so	 because	 being	 born	 in	 different	
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countries	also	matters	-the	abandonment	of	methodological	nationalism	allows	us	to	see	this	from	a	wider	perspective.	In	his	work	on	globalization	and	inequality,	Branko	Milanovic	has	showed	that	while	inequality	has	increased	within	countries,	it	has	diminished	between	them,	so	that	reactions	against	globalization	 	on	the	part	of	those	social	groups	that	feel	most	damaged	by	it	(blue-collar	workers	in	rich	countries,	mostly)	can	be	understood	as	a	defence	of	the	greater	"citizenship	rent"	that	enjoy	citizens	of	advanced	societies7.	This	can	be	defined	as	the	advantage	enjoyed	by	those	who	are	born	in	a	rich	country	-an	exogenous	circumstance	that	is	independent	from	individual	efforts.	Being	against	inmigration,	Milanovic	claims,	is	tantamount	to	defending	our	citizenship	rent.	We	are	defending	our	luck.		The	fundamental	question	concerns	the	relation	between	personal	responsibility	and	impersonal	compulsion.	The	latter	was	defined	by	Friedrich	Hayek	as	the	forceful	adaptation	to	be	made	by	most	social	actors	in	the	face	of	an	economic	or	technological	change	that	depreciates	or	neutralizes	our	abilities	or	assets8.	It	is	impersonal,	since	it	does	not	derive	from	a	decision,	but	is	rather	the	outcome	of	 a	 social	 process	 that	 aggregrates	 millions	 of	 individual	 decisions	 and	 causal	 effects;	 it	 is	compulsive	because	those	who	do	not	adapt	will	be	left	behind.		It	could	be	deduced	therefrom	that	the	state	is	obliged	to	make	a	supplementary	effort	in	exceptional	times,	 i.e.	 times	 in	 which	 an	 accelerated	 and	 radical	 transformation	 in	 pre-existing	 economic	conditions	take	place.	In	other	words:	where	a	reasonable	management	of	one's	own	life	opportunities	
is	not	enough	to	secure	a	socioeconomic	position	that	is	accord	to	our	abilities.	Or:	when	one	would	like	to,	but	cannot.	After	all,	if	an	individual	acts	responsibly	and	aptly,	but	the	system	fails	him,	it	cannot	be	said	of	her	that	she	acted	irresponsibly.	Therefore,	it	would	not	be	just	to	punish	him	as	if	he	had	been.		However,	this	principle	is	easy	to	formulate	but	hard	to	implement.	What	exactly	is	"a	reasonable	management	of	one's	own	 life	opportunities"?	 If	 a	person	 completes	a	degree	 in	Architecture	or	Journalism	and	steps	in	a	market	saturated	with	architects	and	journalists,	whose	fault	is	that?	Tha	same	 goes	 for	 someone	 who	 makes	 a	 bad	 management	 decision	 or	 misses	 obvious	 business	opportunities.	 A	 case-by-case	 analysis	 could	 be	 done,	 but	which	 public	 administration	 has	 such	capacity?	This	rationale	could	also	be	applied	to	the	"socioeconomic	position	that	is	accord	to	our	abilities".	Morever,	the	compensation	sytem	that	could	be	implemented,	since	the	device	that	pushes	people	to	new	spheres	of	economic	activity	should	be	preserved,	lest	the	whole	economic	system	is	damaged	and	no	money	to	pay	compensations	exists.		As	 a	 result,	 the	 relationship	 between	 personal	 responsibility	 (as	 derived	 from	 the	 principle	 of	autonomy)	 and	 impersonal	 compulsion	 (as	 resulting	 from	 the	market	 process)	 cannot	 be	 easily	discerned.	Yet	it	is	a	troublesome	relationship	that	cannot	be	disdained	by	invoking	the	primacy	of	personal	liberty	(that	makes	individuals	ultimately	responsible	of	everything	that	befalls	them)	or	by	doing	just	the	opposite	(describing	a	deterministic	mechanism	where	individual	actors	disappear	under	the	sheer	oppresive	force	of	systemic	structures).	A	basic	economic	fact,	that	derives	from	the	basic	political	fact,	is	hinted	at:	the	impossibility	to	reconcile	the	individual	and	the	collective	realms.	The	interplay	between	the	micro	and	the	macro	levels	is	similar	in	both	cases:	the	capitalist	economy	produces	innovations	that	are	benefit	to	all,	but	punishes	particular	groups	and	members	of	such	society	during	the	process.	Unless	we	suppress	economic	competence	upon	which	markets	depend,	these	 two	perspectives	 are	 irreconciliable.	This	 reality,	 as	 inequality	 itself,	 is	 tragic.	 It	 cannot	be	solved,	although	its	-their-	most	destructive	consequences	can	and	should	be	alleviated.		In	sum,	the	reasons	that	explain	the	increase	in	inequality	in	the	global	age	reinforces	the	view	that	inequality	is	not	a	political	problem	in	itself,	but	a	sociofact,	i.e.	a	feature	of	social	relations	that	exist	in	any	given	social	body.	As	societies	become	more	complex,	however,	the	abilities	of	individuals	to	
																																																						7	 Branko	 Milanovic,	 Global	 Inequality.	 A	 New	 Approach	 for	 the	 Age	 of	 Globalization,	 The	 Belknap	 Press,	Cambridge	y	Londres,	2016.	8	Friedrich	Hayek,	The	Constitution	of	Liberty,	Routledge,	Londres,	2006,	p.	140.	
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make	 individual	 progress	 are	weakened,	while	 a	 basic	 social	 protection	 is	 granted	 by	 the	 state.	Differences	in	birth	gain	importance	as	social	mobility	is	reduced	-and	the	farther	we	are	from	a	Year	Zero,	the	greater	inequalities	tend	to	be.	As	a	result,	inequality	becomes	a	political	problem	due	to	a	growing	social	discontent	and	an	increasing	propensity	to	protest	on	the	part	of	those	who	are	or	feel	left	behind	when	compared	to	others.	Politicization,	even	a	pre-emptive	politicization,	is	thus	advisable.		
4.	Political	emotions	and	inequality.		We	may	well	agree	that	inequality,	not	being	a	political	problem	but	a	social	feature,	must	however	be	 politicized	 in	 order	 to	 preserve	 a	 democratic	 social	 order	 -or,	 reversely,	 to	 pull	 down	 a	 non-democratic	one	where	inequality	is	reinforced	by	social	and	economic	structures	that	prevent	social	mobility.	Yet	this	politicization	brings	about	its	own	problems,	which	I	would	like	to	discuss	briefly	in	order	to	highlight	how	difficult	it	 is	to	deal	politically	with	this	issue.	Above	all,	I	would	like	to	highlight	resentment,	a	political	emotion	that	usually	makes	itself	visible	during	economic	crisis	and	takes	the	form	of	a	dennounciation	-that	of	an	unfair	treatment	that	in	turn	demands	reparation.	In	fact,	it	could	well	be	seen	as	akin	to	Nozick's	rectification	principle:	the	complaint	would	not	concern	the	ilegitimate	possession	of	goods,	but	rather	the	resentful	citizen	claim	that	he	is	dispossessed	for	illegitimate	reasons.	The	resentful	citizen	describes	the	harm	she	has	suffered	as	unjust,	opening	the	door	for	a	social	change	that	is	repairing	in	nature.	Martha	Nussbaum	thus	claims	that	resentment	is	a	moral	emotion	that	entails	an	idea	of	what	is	just9.		The	key	point	is	to	distinguish	between	reality	and	belief:	the	subjective	belief	that	an	injustice	has	been	done	and	its	objective	existence.	Somehow,	this	distinction	is	present	in	some	authors.	John	Rawls	argues	that	a	"rational"	subject	cannot	feel	envy,	at	least	not	while	the	differences	between	her	and	the	others	are	not	perceived	as	unjust	or	exceed	certain	limits10.	This	is	a	key	point:	if	those	differences	are	just	but	excessive,	the	individual	-albeit	rational-	will	feel	envy.	An	objective	injustice	demands	reparation,	whereas	an	imaginary	injustice	does	not.	The	process	by	which	these	emotions	are	formed	is	decisively	mediated	by	the	framing	of	the	injustice/inequality.	Instead	of	taking	anger	as	the	automatic	answer	to	the	lack	of	recognition	that	suffers	the	angered	citizen,	it	all	depends	on	the	way	in	which	that	experience	is	constructed:	there	may	be	no	injustice	at	all	or	the	latter	may	be	attributed	to	the	wrong	source11.		How	to	distinguish	them?	Who	is	to	decide	whether	we	face	a	real	or	imaginary	injustice?	Rawls,	while	discussing	"the	problem	of	envy"	for	a	well-ordered	society,	solves	the	problem	by	putting	the	burden	of	proof	on	the	resentful,	appealing	to	the	deliberative	dimension	of	a	pluralist	democracy:		"If	we	resent	our	having	less	than	others,	it	must	be	because	we	think	that	their	being	better	off	is	the	result	of	unjust	institutions,	or	wrongful	conduct	on	their	part.	Those	who	express	resentment	must	be	prepared	to	show	why	certain	institutions	are	unjust	or	how	others	have	injured	them"12.		In	other	words,	the	resentful	must	persuade	the	other	participants	in	the	public	conversation	of	her	good	 reasons.	 But	 this,	 being	 the	 only	 solution,	 is	 however	 a	 tricky	 solution.	 Specially	 since	 the	relationship	between	envy	and	resentment	is	far	from	morally	edifying.	As	the	former	is	a	shameful	feeling	that	we	can	hardly	acknowledge	in	public,	the	solution	is	often	to	transform	envy	in	righteous	
																																																						9	Martha	Nussbaum,	Political	Emotions.	Why	Love	Matters	for	Justice,	The	Belknap	Press	of	Harvard	University	Press,	Cambridge	y	Londres,	2013,	p.	344.	10	John	Rawls,	op.	cit.,	1971,	p.	530.	11	 Simon	 Thompson,	 "Anger	 and	 the	 struggle	 for	 justice",	 en	 S.	 Clarke,	 P.	 Hoggett	 y	 S.	 Thompson	 (eds.),	
Emotions,	Politics	and	Society,	Palgrave,	Basingstoke,	2006.	12	John	Rawls,	op.	cit.,	1971,	p.	467.	
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indignation	through	a	re-writing	of	the	story	we	tell	ourselves,	arguing	that	the	other	has	achieved	the	object	of	our	envy	by	illegitimate	and	inmoral	means13.		Social	and	political	mobilization	 is,	of	course,	an	ordinary	way	of	making	demands	 in	democratic	regimes.	The	problem	with	resentment-driven	protest	 in	complex	societies	 is	that	sometimes	the	demand	made	by	groups	or	citizens	may	be	misguided,	but	produces	political	effects	all	the	same.	Let	us	take	the	financial	crisis,	which	 is	 the	aggregate	result	of	so	many	decisions	that	the	blame	cannot	be	attributed	clearly	to	any	of	them.	In	countries	that	suffered	a	real	state	bubble,	like	Spain,	a	citizen	ends	up	being	economically	punished	irrespective	of	her	own	contribution	-she	might	have	rented	her	home,	in	fact.	Moreover,	economic	policy	depends	on	governments	and	governments	are	chosen	by	the	electorate,	which,	by	doing	that,	becomes	also	responsible	for	the	decisions	adopted	by	its	representatives.	In	Spain,	the	Socialist	Party	claimed,	ahead	of	the	general	elecion	in	2008,	that	no	 economic	 crisis	was	 in	 sight,	whereas	 the	 Conservative	 Party	 said	 just	 the	 opposite.	 Spanish	voters	backed	the	Socialist	Party,	thus	giving	a	mandate	to	the	ensuing	government	not	to	prevent	the	crisis.	Many	of	these	very	voters	unseated	the	President	in	the	next	general	elections,	after	he	had	been	pushed	by	events	to	make	deep	cuts	in	public	finances	in	order	to	avoid	Spain's	bankruptcy	at	the	end	of	2010.	As	it	happens,	those	who	dramatize	their	resentment	through	a	display	of	anger	have	an	advantage:	the	visibility	of	the	claim,	linked	to	a	harm,	neutralizes	any	appeal	that	can	be	made	to	the	history	of	that	harm.	Only	the	problem	we	face,	full	of	affective	force,	counts	-original	causes	do	not.		But	the	mobilization	of	resentment	poses	some	other	conundrums.	Firstly,	the	ability	to	be	listened	to	by	state	actors	and	to	be	granted	a	compensation	depends	on	the	group's	visibility,	in	turn	highly	dependent	on	dramatization	and	turnout.	But	nothing	guarantees	that	the	most	unfairly	treated	are	the	ones	who	get	the	attention,	nor	that	their	demands	are	consistent	or,	for	that	matter,	that	their	relative	 inequality	 is	 the	 outcome	 of	 an	 unfair	 treatment.	 Secondly,	 moreover,	 an	 effective	mobilization	of	this	powerful	emotion	can	lead	to	further	inequality	if	disadvantaged	groups	remain	invisible	or	not	attended	to.		Regarding	the	question	about	the	nature	of	inequality,	it	is	interesting	to	distinguish	between	envy,	emulation	and	resentment.	They	are	members	of	the	same	moral	family	--that	of	mimetic	desire-	without	being	exactly	the	same	thing.	To	differentiate	them	is	important,	in	order	to	answer	to	each	of	those	affects.	Pure	envy,	after	all,	cannot	be	satisfied.	Rawls	distinguishes	between	a	general	envy	that	is	experienced	by	the	disadvantaged	against	the	advantaged,	and	a	specific	envy	that	is	intrinsic	to	 rivalry	 and	 competition,	 irrespective	 of	 the	 departing	 point	 of	 the	 participants.	 The	 most	destructive	envy	is	the	hostility	towards	other	people's	goods	although	they	make	no	harm	to	us.	However,	envy	can	be	positive	to	the	whole	society	when	integrated	into	the	market	economy,	i.e.	when	it	is	transformed	into	emulation:	the	aspiration	to	be	where	others	are.	Obiovusly,	these	fine	conceptual	 distinctions	 can	 hardly	 be	 found	 in	 the	 real	 world,	 where	 actual	 affects	 will	 be	intertwined.	Yet	it	is	not	the	same	thing	to	react	against	other	people's	fortunes	by	setting	up	a	firm	than	by	throwing	stones	against	a	villa.		In	order	to	avoid	the	negative	consequences	of	envy,	Rawls	set	up	a	double	defence	line.	On	the	one	hand,	a	number	of	basic	rights	and	redistributive	principles	oriented	to	provide	every	citizen	with	opportunities;	on	the	other,	 legal	and	political	 institutions	that	make	possible	to	channel	genuine	claims	on	the	part	of	those	citizens	that	think	or	feel	having	been	unjustly	treated.	This	would	not	erradicate	envy,	but	would	make	it	socially	manageable.		Therefore,	the	crucial	distinction	is	that	between	a	specific	or	competitive	envy	from	which	no	rights	are	deduced,	and	a	justified	resentment	that	points	towards	unjustices	that	must	be	repaired.	The	latter	are	less	likely,	but	still	possible,	in	a	democratic	society.	On	its	part,	specific	envy	is	a	natural	outcome	of	the	ordinary	functioning	of	a	liberal	society	and	a	market	economy.	This	structural	envy	
																																																						
13	 Jon	Elster,	Explaining	 Social	Behavior.	More	Nuts	 and	Bolts	 for	 the	 Social	 Sciences,	 Cambridge	University	Press,	Cambridge,	2007,	p.	158-159.	
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could	 lead	 to	a	negative	view	of	 liberal	 societies.	As	Peter	Sloterdijk	has	claimed,	 the	 latter	have	abolished	serfdom,	but	invented	the	loser14.	One	becomes	a	winner	or	a	loser	by	just	leading	a	life	in	societies	that,	albeit	providing	a	basic	equality,	acknowledges	their	members'	right	to	prosper.	This	will	 in	 turn	 lead	 to	 increasingly	 wider	 differences	 in	 wealth,	 status,	 sexual	 advantaged	 and	intellectual	 superiority.	 As	 these	 goods	 are	 reduced	 and	 often	 positional,	 the	 liberal	 system	accumulates	a	huge	deposit	of	envy	and	bad	tempers	among	the	defeated	contenders,	not	to	speak	of	the	really	damaged	and	marginalized.	That	is	why	resentment	is	less	an	intraindividual	emotion	than	a	social	relation	located	in	specific	contexts15.		Does	this	mean	that	the	whole	liberal	society	is	founded	on	envy	and	is,	therefore,	a	net	producer	of	resentment?	 Actually,	 the	 reverse	 can	 also	 be	 said:	 liberal	 societies	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 efficient	organizers	of	envy,	as	they	try	to	transform	it	into	creative	emulation	not	resentment:	creating	an	incentive	and	not	a	hindrance.	The	desire	to	emulate	others	is	supposed	to	lead	to	self-construction	rather	than	to	self-destruction.	Sloterdijk	himself	has	suggested	that	the	"valorative	passions"	-such	as	 fame,	 vanity	 or	 ambition-	 are	 dangerous	 but	 inerradicable,	 as	 well	 as	 highly	 productive	 for	mankind	as	a	whole,	as	strong	drivers	of	moral	and	material	progress.	An	idea	that	suggest	the	need	to	pay	attention	 to	 the	 level	of	 the	species	when	meditating	upon	 the	nature	 -political	or	not-	of	inequality.		
5.	Coda:	inequality,	the	larger	view.		What	happens	 if	we	abandon	the	current	 framework	 for	discussing	 inequality,	based	established	societies	and	historicized	values,	either	liberal/capitalistic	or	egalitarian/socialist,	and	take	a	longer	view?	That	is,	if	we	adopt	an	evolutionary	approach	that	explains	social	evolution	focusing	on	the	species'	traits	and	their	combination,	in	order	to	make	sense	of	the	increasing	complexity	of	human	societies.	Where	happens	to	inequality	under	that	framework?		This	is	not	the	place	to	develop	this	point	extensively,	but	some	suggestions	will	suffice	to	make	the	point.	 I	 will	 dwell	 on	 biologist	 Earle	 Ellis'	 paper	 from	 2015,	 where	 he	 attempts	 to	 develop	 an	"Anthro-Ecology",	a	powerful	and	thorough	synthesis	of	evolutionary	theory,	biology,	and	the	social	sciences	in	order	to	explain	why	human	beings	have	colonized	the	planet16.	What	is	interesting	for	my	purposes	 is	precisely	 the	why:	 the	 reasons	 for	 the	way	 in	which	human	beings	behave	as	an	especies.		As	Ellis	suggests,	there	are	two	patterns	of	human	social	behavior	that	are	key	for	making	sense	of	human	societies	evolution.	The	first	is	the	unrivalled	capacity	of	humans	to	transmit	information	by	social	 learning,	 exemplified	by	human	use	of	 language:	humans	 are	 far	more	 capable	 than	other	species	of	social	learning	across	both	kin	and	non-kin	individuals,	and	especially	across	generations.	The	second	is	their	unparalleled	capacity	to	form,	sustain	and	depend	for	survival	on	complex	non-kin	 relationships,	 what	 makes	 us	 the	 most	 ultrasocial	 species	 on	 Earth.	 Most	 importantly,	 an	increasing	dependence	on	non-kin	subsistence	exchange	networks	has	enabled	human	societies	to	become	increasingly	specialized,	complex	and	hierarchical.	As	Ellis	describes:		"Specialization	and	exchange	in	subsistence	regimes	have	made	it	possible	for	human	individuals	to	subsist	apart	from	any	direct	interactions	with	ecosystems	(though	not	without	indirect	interactions,	or	telecoupling),	with	all	subsistence	needs	met	through	exchange	networks	of	subsistence	producers	(i.e.,	farmers,	fisherman),	processors	 (food	 preparation),	 providers	 (traders),	 and	 potentially	 many	 more	 specialists	 (tool	 makers,	irrigation	experts,	bankers)	in	complex	and	dynamic	subsistence	supply	chains	(‘'subsistence	webs’')	inviting	further	study	as	‘'socio-trophic	relations'."		
																																																						14	Peter	Sloterdijk,	Zorn	und	Zeit,	Zorn	und	Zeit.	Politik-Psychologischer	Versuch,	Suhrkamp,	Frankfurt,	2006.	15	Stefano	Tomelleri,	 "The	sociology	of	 resentment",	 en	B.	Fantini,	D.	Martín	Moruno,	 J.	Moscoso	 (eds.),	On	
Resentment.	Past	and	Present,	Cambridge	Scholars	Publishing,	Newcastle,	2013,	259-276.	16	Earle	Ellis,	"Ecology	in	an	anthropogenic	biosphere",	Ecological	Monographs,	2015,	85(3),	287-331.	
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In	 turn,	 the	 social	 organization	 of	 societies	 -including	 their	 institutions,	 beliefs,	 complexity	 and	degree	of	specialization-	are	seen	as	responses	to	the	population	size	and	densities	sustainable	by	their	primary	subsistance	technologies,	together	with	the	accumulation	of	these	and	other	cultural	inheritances	over	time	through	cultural	evolution.		My	conclusion	from	this	is	that	inequality	does	not	exist	for	political	reasons,	i.e.	a	conscious	decision	about	how	to	build	up	a	social	system	that	leads	to	an	unequal	distribution	of	wealth,	but	is	a	non-intended	product	of	societal	evolution.	Inequality	within	particular	societies	take	place	at	the	micro	level,	whereas	societal	evolution	in	the	direction	of	an	increasingly	complex	and	specialized	societies	take	place	at	the	macro	level.	Humans	innovate,	produce,	specialize,	communicate	-a	process	that	van	be	explained	with	evolutionary	tools	in	a	non-deterministic	fashion.	Probably,	the	key	feature	is	that	 of	 complexity:	 societies	 cannot	 but	 be	 increasingly	 complex,	 especially	 after	 the	 natural	tendency	of	 individuals	 and	groups	 to	 specialize.	 In	 this	 context,	 as	 societies	 scale	up,	 inequality	becomes	an	unavoidable	feature	of	human	communities.		That	said,	cultural	evolution	also	exist.	 Inequality	has	always	been	a	social	 issue,	since	the	moral	conditions	within	human	communites	affect	their	ability	to	cooperate	actively	-not	to	mention	some	innate	sense	of	reciprocity	that	is	activated	when	flagrant	injustices	take	place.	Therefore,	inequality	becomes	 politicized	 despite	 it	 not	 being	 originally	 a	 sociofact.	 That	 is	 also	 the	 reason	 why	 its	politicization	should	be	soft	rather	than	hard,	as	the	failure	of	state	socialism	demonstrates.	A	hard	politicization	aimed	to	achieve	total	equality	threatens	to	block	the	channels	through	which	human	material	 and	 moral	 progress	 takes	 place.	 A	 soft	 politicization	 is	 intended	 to	 guarantee	 that	 all	members	 of	 society	 are	 provided	 with	 a	 number	 of	 basic	 rights	 and	 services,	 enjoy	 equal	 life	opportunities,	and	are	compensated	when	unfairly	treated	or	prevented	by	historical	circumstances	to	make	the	most	of	her	abilities.		
6.	Conclusion.		This	paper	has	reflected	upon	the	nature	of	inequality,	trying	to	answer	the	question	as	to	whether	it	is	a	political	problem	or	rather	a	non-political	one.	On	my	view,	it	is	a	non-political	problem,	since	it	does	not	spring	from	a	political	organization	of	resources	-despit	the	fact	that	actual	societies	are	organized	and	distribute	their	resources	in	a	certain	way	when	an	individual	is	born	in	it.	However,	I	have	tried	to	show	that	unless	a	totalitarian	level	of	coercion	is	employed,	there	is	no	way	to	avoid	that	a	society	becomes	unequal	when	in	motion	-even	if	the	departure	point	is	total	socioeconomic	equality.	 The	 reason	 is	 threefold:	 different	 abilities	 and	 talents,	 different	 choices	 and	 luck,	 an	economic	life	where	different	yields	are	obtained.	The	reasons	for	the	increase	of	inequality	in	our	times	have	also	been	explored,	pointing	out	the	conflict	between	personal	autonomy/responsibility	and	impersonal	compulsion.	This	conflict	confirms	that	inequality	should	be	politicized,	despite	it	not	 being,	 properly	 speaking,	 a	 political	 problem.	 Yet	 politicization	 creates	 problem	 of	 its	 own,	reinforcing	 the	actual	 impossibility	of	achieving	antyhing	 like	a	 "fair	equality".	 I	have	 focused	on	resentment	and	envy,	which	often	leads	to	angered	claims	about	an	unfair	treatment	that	demands	compensation.	Finally,	a	larger	view	is	suggested	-that	of	the	human	species	as	a	whole.	By	taking	a	non-deterministic	evolutionary	approach	that	takes	into	account	cultural	evolution,	the	increasing	complexity	 of	 human	 societies	 -of	 which	 individual	 and	 group	 specialization	 is	 a	 main	 driver-	becomes	the	framework	(at	the	macro	level)	where	inequality	unavoidably	emerges	(at	the	micro	level).	Yet	this	view	of	human	beings	comprise	cooperation	as	one	of	the	features	of	our	ultrasocial	species,	which	means	that	a	certain	degree	of	equality	is	required	for	human	groups	and	societies	to	remain	functional.	As	a	result,	the	soft	politicization	of	this	non-political	problem	is	justified.								
